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This chapter seeks to explore the character of popular mobilization in 
South Africa, mostly at the local level. This is done through exploring the 
interaction of two independent processes. The first concerns the rela-
tive empowerment of political parties and the disempowerment of civil 
society (especially social movements) by the democratization process in 
South Africa. The second concerns the introduction of new institutions 
of public participation in local governance. Hence, while the latter are 
portrayed as ‘invited spaces’ in which communities can engage the local 
state constructively, the poor design of these spaces, a lack of genuine 
will on the part of elites and the relative power of key social actors mean 
that, in practice, they are either meaningless processes or simply co-opted 
by political parties. Notably, civil society has tended either to disengage 
from the local state and focus on provincial and national levels, or to 
resort to forms of popular protest to be heard by local government – the 
non-governmental organization (NGO) sector usually favouring the first 
approach and social movements the second.
This ‘disengaged–enraged’ dichotomy reflects clearly the failure of 
the formal invited spaces for public participation in local governance. 
Furthermore, it is hard to see how this dynamic will change, even with 
better-designed invited spaces, until the balance of social forces is restored 
with the revivification of civil society, and especially social movements. 
Reasons for optimism include the growing popular disgruntlement at 
poor delivery of public goods by local government – which is arguably 
exacerbated by the introduction of meaningless forms of public participa-
tion – and evidence of a new crop of local and organic community-based 
organizations which could form the basis of future social movements. 
In short, popular mobilization at the local level in South Africa remains 
dominated by political parties, despite new participatory institutions, 
although we are witnessing the creation of conditions for new and power-
ful forms of popular mobilization into the future.
In making this argument, the chapter begins with theoretical literature 
on state–society relations, and the character of and relationship between 
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‘invented’ and ‘invited’ spaces. It then moves to the received views in the 
literature on popular mobilization in recent South African history, and the 
nature and purpose of new forms of ‘participatory governance’ at local 
government level. The relationship between these ‘invented’ and ‘invited’ 
spaces is then explored through case studies of two municipalities, with 
special focus on the consequences for popular mobilization. The chapter 
concludes by analysing the causes of demobilization that result from 
participatory governance, identifying the consequent tendency of civil 
society to ‘disengage’ from or become ‘enraged’ at local government, 
and pointing to the necessity of oppositional-movement revival to change 
state–society relations in a more democratic fashion.
Theorizing state–society relations through invented and invited 
spaces
In recent years almost every democratic country in the world, regard-
less of economic development or democratic robustness, has witnessed 
attempts to enhance public participation in governance, especially local 
governance. The reasons for this are many and complex, and can be traced 
to new theories and practices of development (World Bank 1996); new 
theories and practices of democracy (Cohen 2002; Habermas 2002) and 
democratization (Mattes 2002); and at the intersection of all of these, 
new theories and practices of citizenship (Cornwall 2002). Following 
Cornwall (ibid.: 17), these new participatory institutions and practices 
can be termed the ‘invited spaces’ of participatory local governance. These 
invited spaces would include Hendricks’s (2006: 486) ‘micro deliberative 
structures’ and Fung and Wright’s (2001: 5) ‘empowered deliberative 
democratic structures’. Examples are the participatory city budgeting 
in Porto Alegre, Brazil; functionally specific neighbourhood councils in 
Chicago, USA; village governance in Kerala, India; and citizens’ juries in 
the United Kingdom.
Initiated by the local state, invited spaces typically look to draw local 
communities into processes of consultation, deliberation and sometimes 
joint decision-making on key local issues. Perhaps just as important in 
understanding emergent local state–society relations is popular mobil-
ization led ‘from below’ by civil society or local communities. Hence 
Cornwall (2002: 17) contrasts the ‘invited spaces’ created ‘from above’ 
by the state with ‘organic spaces’ created ‘from below’ by those outside 
the state. The latter include spaces created from popular mobilization, 
as well as spaces in which ‘like-minded people join together in common 
pursuits’. Holston and Appadurai (1999) describe the emergence of a 
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rights-based citizenship among the urban poor, marginalized by neolib-
eral governance and mobilized through social movements, which looks 
to transform social relations from the ground up. Miraftab (2006) paints 
a picture of ‘invented’ spaces opposing ‘invited’ spaces in South Africa, 
but also elsewhere in the world, for the same reason, the globalization 
of neoliberal economic policy.
Importantly, as Cornwall and Coelho (forthcoming: 1) indicate, the 
conceptualization of local state–society relations is not exhausted by a 
binary opposition between top-down, state-driven, invited spaces and 
bottom-up, social-movement-driven, invented spaces. Hence they talk of 
a ‘participatory sphere’ that lies at the interface of the public sphere and 
the state, composed of hybrid institutions, some of which are extensions 
of the state and some of which are claimed from the state. The critical 
point is that the relationship of these institutions with the state and 
the general public is partial: ‘its institutions have a semi-autonomous 
existence, outside and apart from the institutions of formal politics and 
everyday associational life … They are spaces of contestation, but also of 
collaboration and co-operation …’. Lastly, but most importantly, Gaventa 
(2007: 2) points out that international experience shows that a functioning 
participatory sphere or meaningful public participation in local govern-
ance requires three things: good institutional design, political will to 
make it happen and a strong civil society.
These theoretical reflections matter to the South African case precisely 
because the last ten years have witnessed a process of institutional reform 
of local governance in the name of greater public participation on issues 
related to the delivery of key social goods. Hence there are very specific 
and identifiable ‘invited spaces’ that have the potential, in theory, to both 
engender more constructive and democratic state–society relations and 
enhance the delivery of social goods. At the same time, there is a particular 
history of social mobilization in South Africa around the liberation strug-
gle which has empowered political parties at the expense of civil society 
and especially social movements. It is this particular dialogue between 
‘invented’ and ‘invited’ which we wish to explore and characterize. In the 
following section we outline this history of popular mobilization, and then 
move to outline the democratic reforms of local governance.
Invented spaces: the changing patterns of popular mobilization 
in South Africa
With the formal deracialization and democratization of South Africa 
in the early 1990s, the fundamental shape of inclusion and exclusion 
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in the political system began to change. Beyond the changes in the for-
mal institutions of rule were parallel shifts in the patterns of popular 
mobilization in the country. During the struggle period, and especially 
the 1980s, popular mobilization was channelled into explicitly political 
anti-apartheid activities. Hence grassroots organizations that emerged 
mostly in urban centres to secure basic public goods like education, 
healthcare and housing united under an explicitly political formation, the 
United Democratic Front (UDF), which identified clearly with the ideology 
and organization of the banned and exiled African National Congress 
(ANC). Closely associated with the ANC-aligned Congress of South African 
Trade Unions (COSATU), the two organizations captured most popular 
mobilization behind the political project of national liberation. In effect, 
then, grassroots and issue-based mobilization was quickly united and 
generalized in national and political terms. In a sense, the ANC was the 
social movement of the 1980s.
While there can be no doubt that this popular mobilization of the 
1980s was tremendously effective and important in hastening the end 
of apartheid, many have pointed out the demobilizing effect that demo-
cratization had on social movements in South Africa (Ballard et al. 2006: 
14–17). With the unbanning of the ANC in 1990, the UDF effectively 
collapsed into the ANC as the latter reconstituted itself as an open organ-
ization in the country. After the 1994 elections the movements that mobil-
ized people were absorbed into the ANC government or into partnership 
with government, and most held the view that government would deliver 
to the poor (Heller 2001: 134). Further, the remaining NGO sector came 
under pressure to ‘professionalize’ and withdraw from advocacy to a more 
limited role in service delivery (Greenstein 2003).
Notably, this demobilization paralleled shifts in donor funding too, 
such that most foreign aid money was channelled into and through the 
new democratic state to build its capacity to meet the many challenges of 
proper administration and the delivery of social goods eschewed by the 
apartheid state on racist grounds. Perhaps not surprisingly, the delivery 
of water, electricity, housing, healthcare and education by the democratic 
state to poor and working people has not met popular expectations. Clear 
evidence of the mounting frustration at what is often seen as government 
incompetence and corruption is found in many popular demonstrations 
about poor service delivery. Hence, in the year preceding the 2006 local 
government elections, there were 5,085 protests against local government 
nationwide (Daily News 2005).
Indeed, according to Ballard et al., these protests are representative 
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of a broader shift in state–society relations. More specifically, they hold 
that from the late 1990s there has been a rebirth in oppositional civil 
society, although only some of this is framed in terms contrary to the 
‘emerging pro-growth consensus’ of Thabo Mbeki’s governance, while 
much is framed in broader rights-based opposition (Ballard et al. 2006: 
400). In addition, foreign donors are now spending more money on civil 
society, but mostly on projects that emphasize practical delivery rather 
than advocacy or challenge. Notably, while there is no neat division be-
tween those movements which will engage the state and those which will 
not, the counter-hegemonic movements’ engagements ‘tend to create 
crises, which more rights-based campaigns can capitalise on to influ-
ence policy and government practice’ (ibid.: 404). Critically, however, 
oppositional civil society is not tremendously strong, and hence Beall et 
al. (2005: 681) argue that emergent state–society relations exist in a kind 
of ‘fragile stability’ that is likely to continue into the medium term until 
new social actors emerge to change this equilibrium.
In sum, then, South African state–society relations are in a state of 
transition, recovering from the vacuum of mobilization left by the social 
movements of the anti-apartheid era becoming the party in government 
or its allies. While enduring real-world problems mean that the condi-
tions remain for popular mobilization around social goods, and there 
is evidence of the growth of more organic and local community-based 
organizations, civil society in all forms, and especially oppositional social 
movements, is not particularly strong. Notably, parallel to these develop-
ments in state–society relations, the post-apartheid state has also looked 
to meet the challenge of better service delivery through reforming local 
governance to operate in more democratic ways. By creating ‘invited 
spaces’ for communities to input into key municipal processes such as 
budgeting and development planning, conditions are created for a new 
and more constructive engagement between state and society. But what 
are these new ‘spaces’ and how well do they work? The next two sections 
explore these questions.
Invited spaces: ‘participatory governance’ and local government 
reform
Post-apartheid local government reform has been an intricate and 
prolonged affair, beginning in the early 1990s and continuing until 2000. 
Central to the functioning of new-look local government is the require-
ment for it to operate in a more democratic manner. Thus Section 152(1) 
of the constitution includes among the objects of local government ‘to 
P
a
rticip
a
to
ry
 g
o
vern
a
n
ce in
 So
u
th
 A
frica
217
provide democratic and accountable government for local communi-
ties’ and ‘to encourage the involvement of communities and commu-
nity organizations in the matters of local government’. In terms of the 
Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000, municipalities 
are required to complement their formal structures of representative 
government with a system of ‘participatory governance’.
Participatory governance Notably, ‘participatory governance’ is not rep-
resentative democracy, understood as the regular election of councillors, 
but refers to the manner in which municipalities govern between elections. 
As argued by Barichievy et al. (2005), there are three substantive aspects 
to the innovation of ‘participatory governance’: the redefinition of the 
municipality, requirements for public participation and ward committees. 
As outlined in Section 2(b) of the Municipal Systems Act, the local com-
munity is included alongside councillors and administrators in the legal 
definition of a municipality, a move of great symbolic significance.
The second innovation is really a set of requirements for public involve-
ment in various decision-making processes. Especially important here are 
the imperatives regarding public consultation on the annual budget, the 
integrated development programme (IDP) review process, the perform-
ance management system, service delivery contracting and all by-laws, 
among others. These bring community participation to the foundational 
activities of local governance. Notably, the practical mechanism through 
which most of this consultation occurs is the mayoral imbizo: a public 
meeting convened by the mayor on one or more of the above issues, 
usually the IDP and the budget.
Last are ward committees, first mentioned in the 1998 White Paper on 
Local Government, but outlined in some detail in the Local Government: 
Municipal Structures Act. This act provides for ward committees to be 
established in each ward of a category A or category B municipality (i.e. 
cities and towns) if the municipality so chooses. Chaired by the ward 
councillor, ward committees are intended to consist of up to ten people 
representing ‘a diversity of interests’ in the ward, with women ‘equitably 
represented’. In respect of their role, ward committees are mostly advisory 
bodies for ward councillors but may enjoy greater powers if the council 
sees fit. Notably, the Guidelines for the Establishment and Operation of 
Municipal Ward Committees (Government Gazette 2005) specified that 
the ‘duties and powers’ delegated to ward committees may not include 
executive powers (Section 5(3)(d)), and instead emphasized their role in 
communication and mobilization.
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While the democratic reform of local government is a worldwide trend, 
especially in the developing world, where the ideas of decentralization 
and democratization have World Bank and donor backing, there is little 
doubt that in South Africa the poor performance of local government 
is an additional reason for participatory governance. As already noted, 
there were 5,085 protests against poor service delivery and corruption in 
local government in 2005. The question naturally arises: did the reforms 
work? To answer this question we conducted two case studies, outlined 
in the following section.
Popular mobilization and ‘participatory governance’ in Msunduzi 
and eThekwini
Msunduzi and eThekwini are two municipalities in the province of 
KwaZulu-Natal. They are different municipalities in many ways. They 
are different categories of municipality, B (town) and A (metropolitan) 
respectively, and thus have a significantly different scale of responsibili-
ties and resources. Msunduzi covers an area of approximately 649 square 
kilometres with a population in excess of 500,000, whereas eThekwini 
covers an area of approximately 2,297 square kilometres with a population 
estimated to be 3.5 million. In addition, the annual budget of Msunduzi is 
in the region of R1.9 billion, whereas eThekwini’s annual budget is seven 
times bigger, at R15 billion. Where Msunduzi spends just less than R40 
million on salaries, eThekwini spends roughly R559 million on staff.
Msunduzi 2001–06: the sleepy hollow
In recent years the Msunduzi municipality has worked quite hard to 
counter the small-town image that the city has enjoyed for some time. 
The city is regularly bombarded with advertisements pronouncing the 
transformation of ‘sleepy hollow’ into ‘vibrant valley’, and the official 
town motto is ‘the city of choice’. Yet if one looks at local governance in 
Msunduzi through the lens of public participation, the view is very much 
one of laid-back, if party-captured, municipal governance intersecting 
with limited community initiative. To sum up in spatial terms, public 
participation in Msunduzi between 2001 and 2006 was mostly a ‘sleepy 
hollow’.
Invited spaces: between benign administration and party capture
policy It is notable that the Msunduzi municipality did not finalize 
a public participation policy during the five years from 2001 to 2006. It 
did manage to generate a draft in 2005, which is still reported to be in 
the consultative phase ( Jackson-Plaatjies 2007). Notably, the draft policy 
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is very brief, at less than five pages in fourteen-point font, and makes 
no reference to civil society whatsoever. Instead emphasis is placed on 
ward committees, izimbizo and various forms of communication between 
communities and councillors. Reference to public participation is also 
to be found in other policies, notably the 2006 Msunduzi Municipality 
Spatial Development Framework Review – Proposed Communication Strategy 
and Plan.
Of these documents, only the latter deals with public participation 
in general terms, and it is notable in identifying civil society organiza-
tions as development stakeholders with rights to participate (and related 
responsibilities) in the project process. Clearly, then, it took some time 
for policy on public participation to make it on to the agenda of the 
Msunduzi municipality, and this despite the fact that Msunduzi imple-
mented ward committees as early as 2001. Further, there seems to be no 
coherent or common conception of public participation, as evident in 
the inconsistencies between the various documents as to who the public 
are (communities and/or civil society) and how they ought to participate 
(ward committees, izimbizo, stakeholder forums or all three). In short, it 
seems that public participation has not been taken seriously as a policy 
priority by the Msunduzi municipality, an insight confirmed by the poor 
implementation of the ward committee system and the public consulta-
tion processes outlined below.
ward  committees Ward committees in Msunduzi operated poorly 
in the period studied for three sets of reasons. First, ward committees 
depend on their ward councillors to operate effectively. Hence, the ward 
councillor is responsible for how often the ward committee meets, what 
it discusses, what information ward committee members acquire and 
what information the council obtains from ward committees. In the 
Msunduzi case there was evidence that a significant minority of ward 
councillors were simply not up to these tasks, because they were either 
incompetent, ignorant of their responsibilities in respect of ward com-
mittees, or constrained by party political or local power contests (Gardner 
2005; Mngadi 2006). Thus less than 50 per cent of ward committees met 
regularly, and even among those that met regularly, the frequency varied 
widely, from weekly, monthly or bimonthly to annually. In addition, the 
speaker reported that 40 per cent of the ward committees were non-
functional. Conversely, just eight (roughly 25 per cent) were described 
as ‘very functional’. Further, the internal operation of ward committees 
was also dictated by the preferences of the ward councillor, with some 
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reporting an inclusive deliberative style and equal voting rights, and 
 others reserving the decision moment for themselves.
In addition to the functioning of ward committees, the Msunduzi case 
also illustrates the centrality of ward councillors to the constitution and 
composition of ward committees. Thus while consultants were meant to 
institute ward committees, they did not do this in all cases. Several ward 
councillors, many from the Democratic Alliance (DA), reported setting 
up their own structures. Research indicated that as many as eight of 
the original ward committees were later re-established or reformulated. 
Further, the way ward committee members were ‘elected’ varied tremen-
dously. Some ward councillors reported having sectoral representation 
with meetings in localized areas, some had one mass meeting, and others 
co-opted people from existing organizations. Notably, many ward council-
lors reported co-opting new members as ward committee members left 
or stopped participating. Second, ward committees struggled to func-
tion effectively owing to a lack of support from the municipality. More 
specifically, the municipality needed to ensure the correct constitution of 
ward committees, train ward councillors and ward committee members, 
resource committees and, perhaps most importantly, clearly define the 
role of ward committees in council processes. In Msunduzi’s case, none 
of these was done to any satisfactory degree.
Third, and perhaps most importantly for us, ward committees were 
largely captured by local parties or were defined as sites of local political 
competition. Hence, it appeared that all the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 
ward committees, many ANC ward committees and some DA ward com-
mittees were subject to control by their respective local party branch. Not 
only was the perception of the party politicization of ward committees 
widely shared (Steele 2006; Pillay 2006; Nkosi 2005; Thompson 2006; 
Gardner 2005), but the official in charge of public participation stated 
that the ‘politicization’ of ward committees was especially a problem in 
historically black areas (Mngadi 2005, 2006). The politicization took the 
form of overt party control, such that no other parties were tolerated on 
the ward committees (typical of IFP and some ANC wards); intra-party 
competition, such that people in the wrong factions were marginalized 
(Mbeki–Zuma factionalism in the ANC); and policy competition, in that 
DA-led ward committees often refused to cooperate with the ANC-led 
council’s vision of ward committee operation.
Notably, the implications of partisan ward committees extend beyond 
just undermining their independent role, but also directly impact on the 
health of civil society, undermining its ability to engage the local coun-
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cil. This is because the establishment of ward committees has affected 
other organizations and structures already in existence in Msunduzi. In 
formerly advantaged white and Indian areas, ratepayers’ associations had 
tended to carry out some of the functions now allocated to ward commit-
tees. One ward committee (W25) was effectively composed of members 
of the previous ratepayers’ associations in the area; another (W27) was 
either replaced or supplanted by the existing ratepayers’ association; and 
others (W34 and 37) were said to be less effective than, or to duplicate, 
previously existing community structures. One ratepayers’ association in 
a formerly disadvantaged area, the Edendale Landowners and Ratepayers 
Association, continues to exist in a close but ambiguous relationship 
with both the local ANC branch and the ward committee. As the former 
association chair, Mr L. E. M. Nkosi (2005), put it, a close relationship 
between the ANC branch and the ward committee is ‘inevitable’, given 
the very strong influence of the ANC.
Ward committees thus appear to draw on local organizational lega-
cies, either ratepayers’ associations in historically white and, to a lesser 
extent, Indian areas, and political parties in historically black or African 
areas. On one level, this is simply a matter of ward committees draw-
ing on existing social capital (social networks and relations of trust) 
to populate themselves, but on another level, ward committees seem 
to assume much of the functions of ratepayers’ associations, or come 
into the ambit of some form of party agenda-setting. Thus, to the extent 
that ward committees supplant other civil society formations and these 
same ward committees remain colonized by party agendas, we see the 
effective extension of party authority over local areas.
public  consultation  over  budget,  idp,  etc. From 2001 until 
the present, the Msunduzi municipality has undergone four separate 
public consultation processes over the budget and IDP. The first pro-
cess concerned the adoption of the first IDP in 2002. This was a process 
run from the municipal manager’s office, as required by the Municipal 
Systems Act, by a team of five people. Notably at this time there was no 
IDP manager as such. Following the standard IDP process of the time, 
the first IDP was drawn up in roughly a year. There was consultation 
conducted during the analysis and strategy phases of the project, but it 
was restricted largely to various stakeholder groups rather than the local 
community. Thus Holmes (2006) notes that although they had hoped to 
use ward committees as part of this initial IDP process, ward committees 
were not functional enough to fulfil this role in 2002.
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In addition to the emphasis on stakeholders, rather than the general 
public or local communities, in the public participation of the first IDP, 
several stakeholders such as the chamber of commerce and some NGOs 
complained that public consultation was inadequate. Indeed, Holmes 
(ibid.) conceded that while they made a sincere first effort at public 
participation in the IDP process, it was inadequate. That the lopsided 
nature of public participation mattered was reflected in the fact that most 
feedback from stakeholder meetings came from organizations rooted in 
more advantaged communities, such as the chamber of commerce, the 
Scottsville Residents Association and the DA.
The second round of public participation concerned the annual review 
of the IDP and budget in 2004. This round saw the introduction of two 
practices that have become standard since then. The first is the integra-
tion of the annual IDP and budget review into one process in terms of 
statutorily required public participation. Second has been the introduc-
tion of a series of at least five public meetings or mayoral izimbizo located 
in the five service areas of the Msunduzi municipality. A survey of the 
minutes from these meetings in May 2004 revealed a similar format which 
has endured until today. Following presentations on the IDP and budget, 
the audience asked a number of questions which were then answered 
by the various officials on the stage. Meetings took between three and 
four hours. Unfortunately it is not clear from the minutes how many 
people attended the meetings and whether entertainment and food were 
provided for the community. In this regard Madeline Jackson-Plaatjies 
(2007) reports that at this time entertainment and food were provided only 
at some venues, but ‘since then it has now become a standard practice 
that we provide refreshments at all venues. In terms of the entertainment, 
this is still at selected venues as performances are voluntarily conducted 
by these groups.’
A survey of the issues raised reflected a significant variety of concerns, 
often particular to the local areas. Hence in the mostly Indian area of 
Northdale concern over indigent policy was high, whereas in the African 
township of Imbali and the rural area of Vulindlela more emphasis was 
placed on service delivery, especially relating to water and housing. A 
common concern across all meetings was the discrepancy between a 2 
per cent increase in rates and a 6 per cent decrease in the electricity tariff. 
Another notable claim related to izimbizo in that, apparently, many of the 
people who attended did not know their ward councillors (Gwala 2006). 
The third round of public participation was a series of eleven public meet-
ings in November 2004 that served as the formal basis of the IDP review of 
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2004/05. Again the pattern is one of great local variety, with an enormous 
number of often very parochial issues being raised. Nevertheless, overall 
it is clear that service delivery was the most important concern (22 per 
cent) closely followed by social issues (including unemployment, HIV/
AIDS and crime) at 21 per cent and then billing in third place at 13 per 
cent. Housing was fourth at 11 per cent.
other experiments in public participation Two further develop-
ments in respect of participatory governance during this time are worth 
noting. The first concerns experiments in ward-level budgeting. The 
initi ative of the former municipal manager, Bheki Nene, the Shoshaloza 
campaigns were implemented in 2003/04 and 2004/05, using money from 
a national grant. In Shoshaloza One, all thirty-seven wards got R250,000, 
whereas in Shoshaloza Two, just twenty-four of the more needy wards 
got R250,000. In the first round the officials and politicians travelled to 
an area and met the community and talked about their needs, and then 
the councillor would decide on which projects to establish in the area. 
In the second round, councillors drove the process using various com-
binations of ward committees and public meetings to identify projects. 
While the processes were far from uniform or always participatory, many 
nevertheless reported more enthusiasm and participation in both ward 
committees and izimbizo dealing with this issue (Raja 2006; Davids 2006). 
This suggests that empowering public participatory structures may well 
improve participation in them. It is worth noting that the Shoshaloza 
campaign is now also a subject of the ongoing investigation by the Scor-
pions (the special intelligence unit of South African government, since 
disbanded) into corruption in the municipality, and that the official in 
charge of administering the campaigns refused either to provide docu-
mentation he had previously promised us or to talk to us further.
Last but not least, many respondents noted a reasonably transparent 
and inclusive culture of governance during Mayor Hloni Zondi’s tenure. 
As shown below, many key civil society organizations had a reasonable 
working relationship with the city, and the council was remarkably acces-
sible to the public as regards meetings. Hence members of the public 
were not just entitled to attend every council meeting, but could attend 
committee meetings too, and could speak for up to three minutes on 
any issue. Further to facilitate participation, public contributions were 
taken at the start of the meeting rather than the end. In the words of 
current Msunduzi municipal manager and long-time city councillor Rob 
Haswell, community participation in committee life was ‘vigorous’. There 
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were moments of political crisis when the executive used its right to hold 
meetings ‘in committee’ (i.e. behind closed doors) to exclude the press 
and public, but these were the exception rather than the rule.
Invented spaces: disengagement from below
civil society: the ngo sector While not as manifold or as powerful 
as in eThekwini, the NGO sector in Msunduzi is significant in size and 
role. Bear in mind we are referring to that section of civil society which is 
reasonably ‘professionalized’ nowadays, and usually has a management 
board and outside funding. We do not include in this category the many 
more local community-based organizations which Ballard et al. (2006: 
17) see as underwriting emergent social movements around the country. 
Owing to time and resource constraints we decided to focus on one sector 
in the NGO pantheon, and identified the welfare sector for two reasons. 
First, it is a relatively well-developed, well-run and accessible sector in 
Msunduzi, and second, it tends to work quite closely with the state. In 
many ways, then, it promised to be a good candidate for exploring local 
state–society relations in general and civil society’s engagement with 
participatory governance in particular. To this end we collected a range 
of documentation and interviewed thirteen activists in the welfare NGO 
community, including from the Children in Distress Network (CINDI), 
Pietermaritzburg Child and Family Welfare, and the Msunduzi Hospice 
and Thandanani Children’s Foundation. We also interviewed probably 
the biggest NGO network in Msunduzi, the Pietermaritzburg Chamber 
of Business.
In terms of engaging the state, respondents were divided between 
those who work quite closely with government, especially provincial 
government, such as Pietermaritzburg Child and Family Welfare, which 
essentially does government work; those who work periodically with gov-
ernment around specific projects, such as CINDI and the Msunduzi HIV/
AIDS projects; and those who work independently of government, such 
as the Thandanani Children’s Foundation. Most respondents who did 
engage government had relationships with provincial government rather 
than local, either exclusively (hospice) or predominantly (Pietermaritzburg 
Child and Family Welfare, AFRA) given the location of welfare resources 
in this sphere rather than the local. This is an important consideration, 
especially when contrasting Msunduzi and eThekwini, with its much 
more extensive resources. The reality is that for many NGOs there is little 
reason to engage the local state rather than the province.
Despite these different relationships with government, all respondents 
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were unhappy with the nature of state–society relations. All complained 
of the slow and narrow vision of government bureaucracy (Molefe 2007; 
Andrew 2007), and many pointed to incompetence and unreliability on 
the part of government in supporting projects (Spain 2007; Layman 2007). 
The key variable here was whether there was a champion in government 
committed to a project who could remain in office long enough to see it 
through. Perhaps most important, though, almost all felt that government 
tended to treat them like service delivery providers rather than equal 
partners, an attitude that was clearly deeply resented (Mfeka and Brisbane 
2007). Indeed, one organization had decided not to engage government 
despite the potential for fruitful partnership precisely because of govern-
ment’s ‘dismissing and patronizing’ attitude. They had found advocacy 
‘meaningless’ as ‘decisions were already taken, and it was a waste of 
time’ (anonymous interviewee). Another respondent reported that ‘the 
term public participation is just a token … our inputs are always ignored. 
It is like a vacuum’ (Todd 2007).
For those who worked closely with local government in the period from 
2001 to 2006, the feeling was perhaps a little more positive. Hence CINDI 
was part of an (initially) successful HIV/AIDS partnership with the Msun-
duzi municipality, and the Chamber of Business reported a ‘cooperative’ 
relationship with the Hloni Zondi administration. Notably, though, both 
respondents reported a deterioration in relations when key individuals 
in government changed, scuppering the HIV/AIDs partnership for over a 
year in one case and setting back council–chamber relations substantially 
in the other (Spain 2007; Layman 2007). This very personal character of 
local state–society relations, plus the comparative insignificance of local 
government resources compared to other spheres, meant that on the 
whole relations with local government were quite limited.
In this context it perhaps comes as no surprise that while respondents 
were aware of ward committees and municipal izimbizo to review the 
budget and IDP, almost none had participated in any of these processes. 
The reason given was simple and consistent across organizations: it was a 
waste of valuable time. On closer inspection, though, it was revealed that 
this was not only because these structures or processes were perceived 
as making little difference, but because they did not deal with issues of 
direct concern to the welfare sector. To put the point differently, welfare 
organizations did not feel that the municipal budget or development 
planning were that important to them.
Notably, despite the widespread disillusionment with the current 
nature of state–society relations, almost all respondents expressed a 
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desire for more constructive engagement with the state, including local 
government. Doubt was expressed about the possibility of this, given 
past experience, but most noted the synergies in development agendas 
between the post-apartheid government and the NGO sector. The divide, it 
seems, was much more about how good policies should be implemented 
rather than the nature of the policies themselves. To put the issue another 
way, the current problems are more practice-based than ideology-based. 
This is not necessarily the case with social movements, however.
social  movements The kind of militant social movement ‘direct 
 action’ experienced in eThekwini is largely absent in Msunduzi. This is 
despite the existence of a small social movement forum comprising a 
few left-wing academics, and some community activists. It seems that 
the main organizational ingredient in this forum is the Eastwood Com-
munity Forum (ECF), which has had a series of conflicts with the local 
ward councillor, including over the failure to instal traffic calming in the 
area (Makhatini 2006). According to the leader of the ECF, Fred Wagner 
(2005), the ECF was formed because the local councillor ‘was useless’ in 
dealing with the local issues of water, housing evictions and rates, hence 
the community’s turning to direct action:
The only time the council listens is when we toyi-toyi [protest]. Govern-
ment only listens when you take to the streets. You send letters and so 
on and nothing happens. Paperwork they throw … in the bin. They don’t 
come to the people with public meetings. It’s only now that it’s going to 
elections that they start to do stuff.
Notably, one respondent (Homeboy 2007) accused Wagner of a simi-
larly exclusive style of operation, with few public meetings and little debate 
at those meetings. ‘Mostly Fred just gives report-backs and  handles issues 
on an individual basis with his close allies. He is effectively a paternalistic 
Godfather figure.’ There have also been periodic local protests against 
various social issues in poor communities: for example, a community 
march in Edendale against a taxi fare increase was tear-gassed by police, 
but as far as we can tell these events have not spawned community-based 
organizations nor been sustained over time.
eThekwini 2001–06: the neoliberal battleground
The differences between Msunduzi and eThekwini are not just of 
quantity, but of quality too. This is especially the case in respect of the 
administration of the two cities. Whereas in recent years Msunduzi has 
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had a succession of municipal managers who have left in their wake a 
somewhat dubious set of managerial practices, eThekwini has been under 
the clear guidance of city manager Mike Sutcliffe (who, it is worth noting, 
is senior in the ANC to eThekwini mayor Obed Mlaba). Under Sutcliffe’s 
close attention, eThekwini governance has evolved in a more efficient, if 
centralized, direction best characterized as ‘managerialism’. This orien-
tation has influenced the implementation of participatory governance, 
and not always in a beneficial way. At the same time – and, some would 
argue, as a direct result of managerialism – eThekwini has experienced 
much more radical direct action, especially in terms of housing and rent 
evictions, of the ‘counter-hegemonic’ sort typical of social movements. 
Hence, where the space of state–society relations in Msunduzi consti-
tutes something of a ‘sleepy hollow’, in eThekwini it is much more of a 
contest between a ‘managerial’ centre and the ‘militant’ margins: it is a 
neoliberal battleground.
Invited spaces: public participation as managerialism
policy In contrast to Msunduzi, eThekwini has a 2006 public participa-
tion policy entitled Citizen Participation Policy: Framework for eThekwini 
Municipality (CPP 2006). The document emerged from an earlier project, 
the 2004 eThekwini Municipality Community Participation and Action 
Support Strategy (COMPASS 2004), which consulted communities and 
stakeholders in the five management areas of the south Durban basin. 
From this consultation emerged a critique of the failure of community 
participation due to the dominance of public spaces by political parties, 
the lack of city investment in participation between elections, depend-
ence on the ward councillor, poorly developed community stakeholder 
structures, the limited impact on community policing forums and the 
general unresponsiveness of local government.
The document advises establishing ‘credible, democratically elected 
and functional civil society and business stakeholder consultation  forums’ 
that are not ad hoc like the Big Mama workshops (ibid.: 28).1 Notably, 
among other things, the document recommends establishing such a 
body in each ward, called a ward community forum (WCF). Similar in 
role to ward committees, the WCF is a body inclusive of all other civil 
society forums, NGOs, political parties, school governing bodies and so 
on, and is ‘the highest decision-making body in the ward’ (ibid.: 32). 
It elects an executive committee which represents the ward in the IDP 
process. Other participation ‘strategies’ listed include regional customer 
service centres, the area-based management system, more accessible ward 
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councillors, an integrated community information gathering system and 
more accountable ward councillors (ibid.: 20–24).
In many ways the COMPASS document is an impressive attempt to deal 
seriously with a felt need for more meaningful community participation 
in eThekwini. Instead of adopting and implementing the (many) recom-
mendations of COMPASS, however, the municipality decided to draft a 
distinct public participation policy. The outcome was a document much 
more oriented towards public participation in theory, and with much 
less by way of practicable mechanisms or instruments to enhance public 
participation (CPP 2006). No mention is made of WCFs or, for that mat-
ter, ward committees. Instead there is a long list of ‘tools’ that includes 
newsletters, citizens’ meetings with councillors, talk shows or interviews, 
public hearings, city festivals, public surveys, local partnerships and an 
NGO charter (or other enforceable by-law) and rules for co-financing civic 
initiatives (ibid.: 54–6).
There can be little doubt that, in real terms of empowering citizens, 
the official public participation policy of eThekwini is a step backwards 
from the COMPASS document. Further, if one reviews the performance 
assessment account of the head of the Community Participation and 
Action Support Unit (CPASU) for 2004/05, it is noteworthy that many key 
performance objectives are really forms of service provision. For example, 
CPASU assisted in setting up soup kitchens in poor areas, facilitated youth 
business training, lent support to gender policy programmes, organ-
ized Masakhane road shows (government-initiated participatory public 
meetings where local and national political leaders listened to issues 
relating to service delivery at community level) and held live broadcasts 
for key government events, such as the state-of-the-nation address. In 
respect of actual public participation, the CPASU drew up a draft policy, 
encouraged members of the public to attend council meetings, partici-
pated in ward-based IDP workshops, helped organized Big Mama 5 and 
organized thirteen decentralized budget hearings. Given the role of the 
IDP organizers, the CPU, in driving the Big Mama and IDP process, it 
seems the CPASU did not do very much by way of facilitating meaningful 
public participation.
ward committees Perhaps the most noteworthy feature of ward com-
mittees in eThekwini between 2001 and 2006 was that there were none. 
According to city Manager Mike Sutcliffe (2006), the reasons for this were 
twofold. First, when the IFP controlled the provincial government, the 
party decided to implement sub-councils instead of ward committees. 
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Second, when the ANC came to power in KwaZulu-Natal in 2004, the city 
decided to go the ward committee route, and approached the province 
to apply in terms of the Municipal Structures Act and publish a Section 
12 notice formally constituting eThekwini as ‘a municipality with a col-
lective executive system combined with a ward participatory system’. 
The provincial local government department under Mike Mabuyakhulu 
‘dropped the ball’, however, and this was never done.
In the interim, though, the city proceeded with ward committee elec-
tions on the assumption that the legal niceties had been completed. A 
large number of ward committees were elected. According to Sutcliffe 
(ibid.), in this process the ANC ‘out-mobilized the DA’ with regard to 
the ward committees in about four DA wards, by dominating ward com-
mittee election meetings although they had lost the ward. This meant 
that while the ward councillor belonged to the DA, the majority of the 
ten members of the ward committee belonged to the ANC. In response 
to this the DA took the matter to court, objecting to the whole ward 
committee process in terms of the failure by province to publish the 
required Section 12 notice. The court upheld the objection and ward 
committee elections were shelved until the next term of local government 
in 2006. Once again, we see party interests undermining the operation 
of ward committees.
public consultation in budget, idp, etc. eThekwini made an im-
pressive start to public consultation over the budget and IDP with the first 
draft IDP in 2001 and 2002. First, it integrated the two, such that instead of 
the traditional approach of allocating resources to departments, resources 
were allocated to priorities as defined by the IDP. Second, it used these 
priorities to establish the key performance areas and indicators central 
to the performance assessment of senior officials. Third, the process of 
drawing up the IDP was both participatory and needs-driven – that is, it 
also drew on community-based planning methodologies. As part of this 
there were a series of five ‘Big Mama’ workshops which constituted the 
main public input into the process.
These workshops drew together some 450 participants from all sec-
tors of civil society and spatial areas of the city, spheres of government, 
unions and traditional leadership. The first such workshop reflected on 
eThekwini’s draft Long Term Development Framework, which envisaged 
the city in 2020. Next were a series of a hundred community workshops 
across the city to assess local needs, followed by a strategic budgeting 
exercise culminating in Big Mama 2 on 4 May 2002 (CPU 2004: 20–26). 
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The needs list obtained through the community process was related to 
sets of existing data and the planning teams proposed various technical 
interventions which were considered at Big Mama 2. Based on this, and 
after engagements with other spheres of government, the municipality 
launched its 2002/03 people’s budget (Big Mama 3) at Kings Park on 
29 June 2002. In February 2003 another Big Mama was called to reflect 
on and revise the budget.
While there is much to admire about the Big Mama process, what has 
happened since 2003 is also important. Not only has there been a clear 
downturn in regular and effective public participation in city planning, 
but a significant amount of time and effort has been invested in the 
development of technical systems in the municipality. The main reason 
for this appears to be the challenge of coming to terms with various 
new statutory and policy requirements from national government, for 
example the Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act 
(MFMA) of 2003. In part, though, it also has to do with the growth of a 
culture of professionalism, and the particular commandeerist style of 
the city manager, Mike Sutcliffe. Hence tremendous energy has been 
invested in developing performance management systems for top officials 
and implementing a new system of area-based management to integrate 
planning spatially within the city. At the same time the city has found 
itself drawn increasingly into international networks of management and 
funding, and it seems clear that the top leadership have global ambitions 
for the city of eThekwini.
All these trends suggest a growing managerialism among the city elite, 
an attitude reflected in the indifference towards public participation 
of late. In the words of city manager Mike Sutcliffe (2006), ‘we know 
what people’s needs are. Indeed, for the next hundred years the needs 
will remain the same, although the rank order might well change.’ By 
implication, public participation can contribute in this regard. He further 
expressed the view that the IDP and budget processes were too complex 
for ordinary people and that meaningful public participation was a long-
term strategy:
communities will spend their money on things that do not do anything. 
Communities spend their money on things that have no lasting impact 
on their lives. All that happens is that the public feels better about de-
veloping their area. Interest groups play a more significant role in public 
participation as they are useful in having more practical goals for the 
municipality.
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Invented spaces: public participation as radicalism If the implementa-
tion of participatory governance ‘from above’ has been uneven, and 
undermined by party conflict and managerialism, the engagement with 
the new institutions ‘from below’ has been quite vigorous. Not only has 
community participation in the IDP process been enthusiastic, but direct 
action outside of these limited participatory governance mechanisms has 
been significant, with several communities engaged in militant protest 
against a perceived council lack of both delivery and policy. Unfortunately 
time and money have prevented us from working in the NGO sector to fill 
out this picture with responses from a sector historically more amenable 
to partnership with government.
social movements eThekwini is famous for its radical social move-
ments. Communities in eThekwini, especially in Chatsworth, were begin-
ning to mobilize around issues relating to poverty, social delivery and 
housing as early as 1997, just a few years into the new democracy. In 
eThekwini, the Concerned Citizens Group (CCG), which eventually evolved 
into the Concerned Citizens Forum (CCF), is considered one of the earliest 
documented community-based social movement formations, mobilizing 
around the plight of poor and indigent communities in KwaZulu-Natal. 
The origins of the CCF are located in a series of political engagements 
arising out of attempts by well-known sociologist Professor Fatima Meer 
to campaign on behalf of the ANC in the Indian township of Chatsworth 
in 1999 (Dwyer 2006: 93). She discovered, however, a reluctance by the 
community to vote for the ANC, given the high levels of poverty and 
pending evictions faced by residents. Eventually, mobilization led to a 
situation where the cases of several families facing eviction were taken 
up by the CCG. This mobilization also led to the revival of ‘flat residents 
associations’ in various parts of Chatsworth.
What is arguably significant about these early mobilizations is that they 
began within the context of a refusal by poor residents to participate in 
local government processes, or a frustration with the lack of responsive-
ness from local councillors and the city. As long as these structures of 
local government, and in particular the municipality, were seen as the 
cause of the social problems faced by these residents, they were not going 
to ‘legitimize’ these structures by participating in them. Arguably this 
political stance came to define and shape much of the social movement 
formation and history that followed.
Between 1999 and 2003, a series of protest activities took place in 
the eThekwini metro under various organizational banners, including 
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the CCF, and some under the auspices of a variety of coalitions such 
as the anti-war coalition, the Palestine Support Committee and People 
Against War. In 2003 a group of eThekwini-based activists and academics 
came together to form a social movement group called the eThekwini 
Social Forum, which eventually evolved into the People’s Social Movement 
(PSM). The broader space of the PSM then affiliated to the KwaZulu-Natal 
branch of the nationally based Social Movements Indaba (SMI), which 
was formally launched in 2005/06, with a variety of eThekwini-based civic 
groups such as the South Durban Community Environmental Alliance, 
the Bayview Flat Residents Association and the Wentworth Development 
Forum being part of this broader collective. Since 2006, the KwaZulu-Natal 
SMI, together with its affiliate bodies, has been one of the most active 
spaces for protests against state forces in eThekwini and the province of 
KwaZulu-Natal, on issues such as housing, service delivery, subsistence 
livelihoods and the environment.
In 2005 a series of frustrations concerning living conditions felt by 
 people residing in the various shack settlements in and around the Syden-
ham and Clare Estate area of eThekwini spilt over into a sustained day-
long protest, which resulted in the residents blockading major roads in 
the city and burning tyres. This protest activity was the start of a number 
of ongoing protest actions organized by a coalition of shack dwellers, who 
eventually came to call themselves Abahlali baseMjondolo (ABM) or the 
Shackdwellers Movement. The ABM has become very popular in the social 
movement landscape, both provincially and nationally. It is regarded as 
one of the largest mass-based movements in the country and attracts a 
considerable amount of financial support from a variety of donors.
The ABM has also become well known for its popular campaign slogan, 
‘No Land, No House, No Vote’, reflecting once again a clear refusal to par-
ticipate in local governance processes if their very basic social demands 
are not addressed first. This social movement perhaps stands out from 
the SMI of KwaZulu-Natal in that it represents primarily informal shack 
residents and has a very specific agenda, focusing on improving housing 
rights for its members. While the ABM started out in KwaZulu-Natal, it 
has also established satellite branches in other provinces.
Social movement protest in eThekwini tends to be very fluid and 
 dynamic, and is usually in response to various ongoing initiatives by the 
city government to bring about major changes that will impact on city 
resid ents in a substantive manner. What has become far more evident 
within social movement activity in this municipality since 2006 is a grow-
ing resentment by particularly low-income communities at the way in 
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which their lives are being disrupted by proposed citywide changes that are 
being carried out by the city authorities in preparation for the 2010 FIFA 
World Cup. This is most evident in the increased levels of protest activity 
that are being undertaken by groups such as the KwaZulu-Natal Subsist-
ence Fishermen’s Coalition, the street traders, the residents’ associations 
of South Durban (most of whom are affiliated to the KwaZulu-Natal SMI) 
and various groups representing informal settlements throughout the city, 
which are all in some way affected by actions taken by the city authorities 
in an attempt to create, according to its IDP, ‘Africa’s most caring and 
liveable city’, having factored into their plans the changes that must be 
made to the city in order to host the soccer World Cup (Nadvi 2007).
Conclusion
Our examination of the cases of Msunduzi and eThekwini confirms 
much in the broader literature on the centrality of political parties to 
popular mobilization in South Africa. This is clear in the way political 
parties manage to dominate the formal local governance landscape, in-
cluding the supposedly neutral and inclusive institutions of ‘participatory 
governance’. There is also evidence, however, of significant civil society 
and social movement mobilization, even if the latter is somewhat uneven 
across the case studies. Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, there 
is evidence to support the claim of growing disenchantment with service 
delivery failure, and the incapacity of the new institutions of participatory 
governance to change this. Indeed, it seems safe to conclude that the 
failure of ‘participatory governance’ can only exacerbate dissatisfaction, 
and so the pressure for change can only grow.
Importantly, though, there is also reason to assert that such change 
is best led by oppositional movements rather than ruling political par-
ties. One obvious critique of participatory governance is that the new 
institutions are largely disempowered, through explicit design in limiting 
the powers and resources of ward committees and public consultation 
processes, but also through less than optimal practices by politicians and 
officials. Where politicians are quick to hijack ward committees – and, 
to some extent, izimbizo – to their own more particular ends, officials 
have approached public participation issues with either indifference or 
a technocratic gaze. In different ways, both actors have undermined the 
limited potential dividend offered by the new ‘invited’ spaces.
While the technocratic approach of officials may be ascribable in 
part to the elitist managerialism of the Mbeki regime (which effectively 
centralized local government financial practices through the MFMA and 
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procurement policies), the behaviour of politicians cannot. Notably the 
political capture of ward committees is not simply an ANC problem, and 
therefore is not fully explicable, as Heller (2001: 154) suggests, in terms 
of the ‘dominant party syndrome’. Rather, the reason political parties 
tend to capture ward committees has to do with a design that places 
ward councillors at the heart of ward committees. It is in the interests 
of every politician to minimize risk and maximize power, and hence 
political capture is incentivized. Importantly, this capture is less obvious 
in relation to processes of public consultation, precisely because these 
are tied less closely to institutions of local party power.
What this means is that even empowering the structures and pro-
cesses of ‘participatory governance’ is not the entire solution in seeking 
more inclusive and constructive state–society relations. They need to be 
 better designed, especially ward committees, so that power can be shared 
between officials and politicians on the one hand and civil society and 
communities on the other. As Gaventa (2007) notes, however, empowered 
institutions of local power-sharing are not enough. Politicians and offi-
cials have to want to make them work, and civil society must be strong 
enough to take the opportunities new spaces provide. To our mind, the 
second of these criteria is the larger challenge. As regards political will, 
it is important to note that, contrary to what Heller (2001) says, the ANC 
is the party with the greatest commitment to public participation in 
South Africa. Hence there is a ‘people’s democracy’ strain in the ANC 
rooted in the ‘people’s power’ style of politics opposing apartheid of the 
1980s (Friedman 2005). Of particular importance here was the experience 
of participation in civic and other community-based organizations in 
historically black areas, which directly influenced the drawing up of the 
Municipal Systems Act of 2000 (Carrim 2006). Further, with the leadership 
change in the ANC, forces more sympathetic to the discourse of popular 
democracy have a greater status.
Of more concern, then, is the relative weakness of civil society and 
especially social movements as regards political parties in South Africa. 
Consequently, the vivification of state–society relations requires the re-
birth of oppositional movements strong enough to make ruling parties 
pay attention and take communities seriously. At the moment it is only 
really the labour unions which have the potential to do this, but they 
are very closely tied to the ruling party, especially the incoming faction 
of the ANC. Hence, until there is a shift in the broader patterns of social 
mobilization for the poor and marginalized, and at the expense of rul-
ing political parties, invited spaces will remain meaningless or co-opted 
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spaces. The good news for oppositional movements is that it is precisely 
by excluding the poor and marginalized that ‘invited spaces’ help to 
create the conditions for the emergence of the movements needed to 
transform local power.
Note
Big Mama workshops include all 
sectors (youth women etc.), areas 
(wards) and actors (civil society, 
officials, politicians) in eThekweni 
around development planning and 
budgeting.
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